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Abstract Schulman[1] has argued that Boltzmann’s intuition, that the psy-
chological arrow of time is necessarily aligned with the thermodynamic arrow,
is correct. Schulman gives an explicit physical mechanism for this connection,
based on the brain being representable as a computer, together with certain
thermodynamic properties of computational processes. Hawking[2] presents
similar, if briefer, arguments. The purpose of this paper is to critically exam-
ine the support for the link between thermodynamics and an arrow of time
for computers. The principal arguments put forward by Schulman and Hawk-
ing will be shown to fail. It will be shown that any computational process
that can take place in an entropy increasing universe, can equally take place
in an entropy decreasing universe. This conclusion does not automatically
imply a psychological arrow can run counter to the thermodynamic arrow.
Some alternative possible explanations for the alignment of the two arrows
will be briefly discussed.
Keywords Landauer’s principle; arrow of time; causality; computers
1 Introduction
In part of his response to Zermelo’s reversibility objections to statistical me-
chanics, Boltzmann[3] suggested it was possible (indeed, inevitable) to have
extended regions of space, and time, that were entropy decreasing, but that
living beings within those regions would be unable to perceive the difference:
For the universe, the two directions of time are indistinguishable, just
as in space there is no up and down. However, just as at a particular
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2place on the earth’s surface we call “down” the direction toward the
center of the earth, so will a living being in a particular time interval
of such a single world distinguish the direction of time toward the
less probable state from the opposite direction (the former toward the
past, the latter toward the future)
Authors such as[4,5] have developed this idea while others[6,7,8] are critical.
As noted in [9][Chapter 12], the perception of ‘up’ and ‘down’ can be
directly traced to particular physical processes in different creatures (and
specifically in the case of humans, the effect of the gravitational field on the
fluid of the inner ear). While it may seem implausible that there could be an
equivalent organ, which monitors the local entropy gradient, and informs the
brain in which direction time is flowing, there remains the possibility that
there is still something about the general functioning of the brain that can
only take place in the direction of entropy increase.
In a recent paper Schulman[1] claims to identify such a function from the
general thermodynamic properties of computations, as physical processes.
He gives a detailed comparison of the components of a computer with the
features of the psychological arrow to show
the extent to which a computer . . . can be said to possess a psycholog-
ical arrow. My contention is that the parallels are sufficiently strong
as to leave little room for an independent psychological arrow.
He then appeals to Landauer’s Principle[10] to show that the intrinsic arrow
of computational processes must be aligned with the thermodynamic arrow.
As a result a computer is
without an independent arrow of time, retaining the past/future dis-
tinction by virtue of its being part of a mechanistic world with a
thermodynamic arrow in a particular direction.
Similar suggestions to Schulman’s can be found in [11,12,2]
when a computer records something in memory, the total entropy
increases. Thus computers remember things in the direction of time
in which entropy increases. In a universe in which entropy is decreasing
in time, computer memories will work backward.[2]
It is argued in this paper that neither Hawking nor Schulman’s arguments
hold.
The structure is as follows. First (Section 2) we will state how we will
treat the thermodynamic arrow of time, and what we mean when we refer to
an ‘entropy increasing universe’ and an ‘entropy decreasing universe’. Then
(Section 3) we consider what it takes for a physical process to embody a
computation and the effect of a time reversal of this physical process. The
processes that result from this temporal reversal are not equivalent to the
processes that can represent a computation. We then show the key result that
equivalent operations to the time reversed processes can be constructed, so
the time reverse of those equivalent operations is a computation in a time
reversed universe (Section 3.4) that is equivalent to the original computa-
tion. This demonstrates the physical possibility of such processes in entropy
3decreasing universes, and gives us a model to further study the possibilities
of computation under such circumstances.
In Section 3.5, we examine the derivation of Landauer’s Principle in an
entropy decreasing universe. We find that the physical assumptions required
for an entropy decreasing universe result in a reversal of the inequality that
occurs in the usual statements of Landauer’s Principle. Rather than necessi-
tating entropy increases, when taking place in an entropy decreasing universe
logical operations necessitate entropy decreases. In retrospect this will seem
rather obvious.
Finally (Section 4) we consider the question of whether systems which
gather, process and utilise information, are simply more likely to arise in
entropy decreasing or entropy increasing universes. We examine this from
the point of view of volume of state space arguments, to see if there is, all
else being equal, any reason to expect that entropy decreasing universes are
inherently hostile to the gathering and retention of information. We find
that, perhaps surprisingly, they are not. We conclude that, on the basis of
statistical mechanical arguments alone, we have no grounds for linking any
computational arrow of time to the thermodynamic arrow of time.
Given the clear manner in which our own information processing seems
aligned to the thermodynamic arrow, this may seem puzzling. We will briefly
consider some possible explanations of this link, but which would require
more complex arguments to justify. A surprising conclusion might be that,
if the psychological arrow of time is necessarily aligned with the thermody-
namic arrow, then it cannot be logically supervenient upon computational
states. Alternatively, if the psychological arrow of time is logically superve-
nient upon information processing, then it must be logically independent of
the thermodynamic arrow.
2 The Thermodynamic Arrow
First it is necessary to make clear what is meant by an entropy increasing
universe and an entropy decreasing universe.
The state space of the universe is formed from the product of the state
spaces of a large number of smaller systems Ω =
∏
i⊗Ωi and a measure, µ,
on regions of the state space. It will be usually only be necessary to consider
grouping the subsystems into a small number of distinct, larger subsystems,
j, with most of the small subsystems grouped into a single ‘environment’, E:
Ωj =
∏
i∈j
⊗Ωi (1)
ΩE =
∏
i∈E
⊗Ωi (2)
Ω = ΩE
∏
j
⊗Ωj (3)
The dynamics are described by an invertible, measure preserving flow φ(t)
on the state space. For any region ∆ ⊆ Ω then µ(φ(t)(∆)) = µ(∆), and there
exists a map φ−(t) such that φ−(t) ◦ φ(t)(∆) = φ(t) ◦ φ−(t)(∆) = ∆.
42.1 Entropy increasing universe
An entropy increasing universe has a microstate that starts in a very small
and special region ∆0 ⊆ Ω. It is assumed that the dynamics of the flow
on the state space is such that, over time, this region spreads out over the
state space. As the measure is preserved, this can only happen by the region
developing a very elongated and filamentary structure. As part of the special
nature of the initial region, it will be assumed that the fine detail of this
elongated and filamentary structure can be ignored for any future evolution
of the system.
The initial region is a direct product of regions over the subsystems:
∆0 =
∏
i
⊗∆i
After the system has evolved, it will not, in general be the case that the
evolved region φ(t)(∆0) is a direct product of regions over the subsystems.
Instead there will be microscopic correlations. The appearance of entropy
increase will be represented by the coarse graining out of these microscopic
correlations.
We will assume that the state space Ωi of each subsystem, i, is divided
into distinct subregions ωi,j , such that ∪jωi,j = Ωi. A direct product of a set
of subregions across all the subsystems:
ωn =
∏
i
⊗ωi,ni (4)
can be represented by the array of integers n = (n1, . . . , nj, . . .) .
φ(t)(∆0) is the coarse grained representation of φ
(t)(∆0). This is defined
to be the smallest superset of φ(t)(∆0) that can be represented by a union of
some set, {n}, of direct products over the subsystems and a direct product
with a subset of the environment. It will be of the form
φ(t)(∆0) ⊆ φ(t)(∆0) = ∪n∆n ⊗∆E (5)
Let the sets
{
∆′i,mi
}
and {∆′E} be the sets of all the regions that satisfy:
∆′i,mi ⊆ ωi,mi (6)
∆′E ⊆ ΩE (7)
and for which there exits some set {m} such that
∆′m =
∏
i
⊗∆′i,mi (8)
φ(t)(∆0) ⊆ ∪m∆
′
m ⊗∆
′
E (9)
5The set {n} and subregions ∆i,ni ∈
{
∆′i,mi
}
and ∆E ∈ {∆′E} that satisfy
the conditions
∆n =
∏
i
⊗∆i,ni (10)
φ(t)(∆0) ⊆ ∪n∆n ⊗∆E (11)
∪n∆n ⊗∆E ⊆ ∪m∆
′
m ⊗∆
′
E (12)
∀{m}, ∆′E , give the coarse graining of φ
(t)(∆0).
In an entropy increasing universe, we assume that the microscopic corre-
lations that develop due to φ(t) play no role in the future evolution of the
system. In effect, this means that we may make the coarse grained replace-
ment
φ(t)(∆0)→ ∪n∆n ⊗∆E (13)
for all future evolution of the system.
The requirement that the initial state ∆0 is such that it produces all these
results, for all realistic maps φ(t), will be referred to as the initial boundary
condition, and the resulting evolution as being in an entropy increasing uni-
verse. For the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that these conditions
can be met.
When looking at the interactions of localised systems at times long af-
ter the initial boundary condition, but long before complete thermalisation
(which occurs at some future time tth), this is represented by:
1. No initial microscopic correlations between macroscopic subsystems;
2. Thermal states are represented by Gibbs distributions at the start of any
interaction.
3. Microscopic correlations develop between the subsystems;
4. The sum of the Gibbs entropies of the marginal distributions of the macro-
scopic subsystems, increases;
5. The microscopic correlations become, for all practical purposes, inacces-
sible and may be coarse grained away;
2.2 Time reversal and symmetry
For clarity, we now state explicitly what we will mean by time reversal and
by time symmetries.
The time reversal of a dynamical system involves taking the time ordered
sequence of regions, ∆t, generated by the flow ∆t = φ
(t)(∆0), time reversing
each individual state, then reversing the order in which the states occur. This
generates a new time ordered sequence of regions ∆Tt.
First we need the notion of the time reversal of the state space. This is
not unproblematic (see [13][Chapter 1], for example) but for the purposes of
this article let us assume that there is no disagreement over the time reverse
of a state in our state space. The time reversal of the state space is a map
∆T = T (∆) ⊂ Ω such that µ(∆T ) = µ(∆) and∆ = T ◦T (∆). For subsystems
T (
∏
i⊗∆i) =
∏
i⊗T (∆i) and for subspaces T (∪n∆n) = ∪nT (∆n). We also
6note if A ⊂ B then AT ⊂ BT and for all state spaces Ω we consider here
ΩT = Ω.
Reversing the order in which the states occur, about the time t = t0,
corresponds1 to t→ 2t0−t. Combined we have the sequence of regions∆Tt =
T (∆2t0−t) = T ◦φ
(2t0−t)(∆0). At t = 0 the sequence is at∆T0 = T ◦φ(2t0)(∆0)
so ∆0 = φ
−(2t0) ◦ T (∆T0). Combined, we have the time reversed dynamical
map φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆):
φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = T ◦ φ(2t0−t) ◦ φ−(2t0) ◦ T (∆) (14)
Two special cases may be more familiar. Firstly, for t0 = 0 we have
φ
(t)
T0(∆) = T ◦ φ
(−t) ◦ T (∆)
Secondly, for a transformation φ(2t0), which takes place over the time period
0 < t < 2t0, then a reversal at t = t0 has the transformation
φ
(2t0)
Tt0
(∆) = T ◦ φ−(2t0) ◦ T (∆)
It is important to note one cannot use the coarse grained description
∪x∆x⊗∆E , defined in the previous section, for the time reversed dynamics.
This coarse graining is valid, in the original dynamics, only for later times so
is valid only for earlier times in the time reversed dynamics.
We now define time reversal invariance and time translation invariance of
the dynamics, although unless explicitly stated, we will not be assuming any
of these invariances hold. We explicitly state them so that it may be clear
where we have not needed to assume them.
The dynamics are time reversal invariant at t0 iff
φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = φ(t)(∆) (15)
Weak time translation invariance is defined as
∀t > 0, s > 0 φ(t) ◦ φ(s)(∆) = φ(t+s)(∆) (16)
and strong time translation invariance as
∀t, s φ(t) ◦ φ(s)(∆) = φ(t+s)(∆) (17)
Strong time translation invariance implies2 φ−(t) = φ(−t), and this in turn
implies φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = T ◦ φ(−t) ◦ T (∆) for all t0.
If a dynamics is time reversal invariant at all times, it is necessarily strong
time translation invariant:(
∀t0 φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = φ(t)(∆)
)
⇒
(
∀t, s φ(t) ◦ φ(s)(∆) = φ(t+s)(∆)
)
(18)
If a dynamics is strong time translation invariant and time reversal in-
variant at a single time, then it is necessarily time reversal invariant at all
times.((
∀t, s φ(t) ◦ φ(s)(∆) = φ(t+s)(∆)
)
&
(
∃t0|φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = φ(t)(∆)
))
⇒
(
∀t0 φ
(t)
Tt0
(∆) = φ(t)(∆)
)
(19)
1 We need: t = t0 → t = t0 and t = 0→ t = 2t0.
2 As stated previously, φ(t) is invertible.
72.3 Entropy decreasing universe
Now we must consider what it means to be in an entropy decreasing universe.
Broadly, this must exhibit the time reversal of the behaviour that defines an
entropy increasing universe. We must postulate the existence of a future
boundary condition, that at some future time τ , the state of the universe
will be in the region of state space ∆T0 and with a suitable dynamics.
The most general means of doing this is to consider the time reversal,
at τ/2, of entropy increasing universes. Take the time ordered sequence of
regions of state space in entropy increasing universes, ∆t = φ
(t)(∆0), with
final region ∆τ = φ
(τ)(∆0). The time reversed dynamics is
∆Tt = φ
(t)
Tτ/2(∆T0) = T ◦ φ
(τ−t) ◦ φ−(τ) ◦ T (∆T0) (20)
The initial condition, in the entropy decreasing universes, is the time reversal
of the final condition of the entropy increasing universes: ∆T0 = T (∆τ ) =
T ◦ φ(τ)(∆0). So the time ordered sequence of regions of entropy decreasing
universes is given by:
∆Tt = T ◦ φ
(τ−t)(∆0) (21)
If the dynamics are time reversal invariant at τ/2, then φ
(t)
Tτ/2 = φ
(t) and
∆Tt = φ
(t) ◦ T ◦ φ(τ)(∆0).
The coarse graining now works in reverse. Over the course of the evolu-
tion of the system, fine grained structure, of an elongated and filamentary
kind, appears. This fine grained structure played no role in the evolution of
the system prior to its appearance. However, its appearance allows the region
of state space to evolve into smaller regions that its initial, coarse grained,
appearance would have indicated. In thermodynamic terms, this can be char-
acterised by a universal tendency for heat to spontaneously flow out of the
environment and cause masses to be raised through gravitational potentials.
When looking at the interactions of localised systems at times long before
the future boundary condition, t = τ , but long after the universe has come
out of complete thermalisation, t = τ − tth, this will be represented by the
reversed set of conditions:
1. A high degree of initial microscopic correlations between macroscopic
subsystems.
2. Microscopic correlations disappear over the course of the interaction;
3. The sum of the Gibbs entropies of the marginal distributions of the macro-
scopic subsystems, is decreasing;
4. The microscopic correlations which disappear, played no role in the ear-
lier evolution of the system. In the future evolution of the system, new
microscopic correlations come into play;
5. Thermal states are represented by Gibbs distributions at the end of any
interaction.
We have been considering regions of state space, and the time ordered
sequences of regions of state space. Any given universe follows only a single
trajectory, a time ordered sequence of individual states. Reversing the tra-
jectory of a given universe necessarily reverses every single time asymmetric
8arrow associated with that universe. When asking whether a particular time
asymmetric arrow is a consequence of the thermodynamic arrow, we cannot
answer the question by simply time reversing the trajectory of our particular
universe. Instead we must look at all the trajectories associated with the time
ordered sequences of regions in the entropy increasing and decreasing cases,
and then see if the arrow we are interested in turns out to have the same
alignment to the thermodynamic arrow for all (or most) such trajectories.
2.4 Time symmetric boundary conditions
Schulman[14] has considered the problem of universes with two time bound-
ary conditions. Although the possibility of such a universe remains questionable[15,
16], it will be useful to consider such a situation here. In these conditions there
is a requirement both that the universe begins in the special initial region of
state space ∆0, and at a remote future time τ ends in the special final region
of state space ∆T0 .
A simple time reversal is not sufficient to deal with this. The possible
trajectories of the system are those that pass through φ(τ)(∆0) ∩ T (∆0) at
t = τ . Equivalent conditions are ∆0 ∩ φ−(τ) ◦T (∆0) at t = 0 or φ(τ/2)(∆0)∩
T ◦ φ
(τ/2)
Tτ/2(∆0) at t = τ/2.
Schulman argues that, provided the time span τ/2 is much greater than
the complete thermalisation time tth, then during the epoch 0 < t < tth the
universe will be indistinguishable from an entropy increasing universe, and
during the epoch τ − tth < t < τ the universe will be indistinguishable from
an entropy decreasing one.
3 The Computation Arrow
A physical computation is a physical embodiment of a combination of logical
operations. A logical operation is an abstract mathematical operation which
takes a finite number of distinct input logical states, {α}, and maps them
to a finite number of distinct output logical states, {β}. Conventionally the
input logical state uniquely determines the output logical state, but there
may be many input states corresponding to the same output state. If this is
the case, the operation is called logically irreversible[10].
We shall call a device logically irreversible if the output of a device
does not uniquely define the inputs.
If each β output state has only one possible α input state, then the operation
is called logically reversible.
The basic operations we need to consider are the NOT operation and
the RESET TO ZERO (RTZ) operations (see Tables 1 and 2)3. The RTZ
operation is perhaps less familiar than logical operations such as AND, OR.
3 For completeness we include the identity or DO NOTHING operation, IDN, in
Table 3.
9Nevertheless, all standard logical operations can be built from suitable combi-
nations of these two operations, and they are the most widely studied logical
operations from the point of view of thermodynamics.
NOT
IN OUT
0 1
1 0
Table 1 Logical NOT
RTZ
IN OUT
0 0
1 0
Table 2 Reset to Zero
IDN
IN OUT
0 0
1 1
Table 3 Logical Iden-
tity
The physical embodiment of a logical operation is a physical process, that
starts with the system in one of a finite number of distinct regions of state
space and evolves the system into one of a finite number of distinct regions of
state space. The distinct regions of state space represent the input and output
logical states. The same region can (and often will) represent both an input
and an output state. The process embodies the logical operation precisely
when states in the region of state space corresponding to an input logical
state always end in the region of state space corresponding to the output
logical state that results from the action of the logical operation upon that
input logical state.
To analyse the thermodynamics, take a state space Ω = ΩS ⊗ΩE , which
is the product of the logical processing system ΩS and environment ΩE
state spaces. In an entropy increasing universe, we assume the environment
is initially in some region E0 ⊂ ΩE and there are no correlations with the
system. Each input logical state α is represented by a region of the state
space of the system Aα ⊂ ΩS , such that Aα ∩ Aα′ = ∅ for α 6= α
′. Similarly
each output logical state β is represented by a region of the state space of
the system Aβ ⊂ ΩS , such that Aβ ∩ Aβ′ = ∅ for β 6= β
′. It is usually the
case, and we will assume it here, that the input and output states of a logical
operation are time reversal invariant subspaces: ATα = Aα and A
T
β = Aβ .
If the logical operation L maps logical states α
L
→ β, then the dynamic
map φ
(tL)
L , acting over the duration tL, embodies that operation if, and only
if, ∀α
L
→ β
φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ E0) ⊆ Aβ ⊗ΩE (22)
At the start of the physical operation, the system will be in one of the
regions that represents one of the input logical states
∆0 = ∪αAα ⊗ E0 (23)
At the end of the physical operation, the system and environment will be
located in the region:
∆tL = φ
(tL)
L (∆0) = ∪αφ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ E0) ⊆ ∪βAβ ⊗ΩE (24)
In an entropy increasing universe, we assume that microscopic correlations
between the system and the environment play no future role. If we are not
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considering time reversals, therefore, for future evolutions of the system we
can replace ∆tL with the coarse grained region:
∆tL = ∪βAβ ⊗ EtL (25)
where ∀E′ ⊆ ΩE such that ∆tL ⊆ ∪βAβ ⊗ E
′, then
∆tL ⊆ ∪βAβ ⊗ EtL ⊆ ∪βAβ ⊗ E
′ (26)
3.1 Temporal reversal
We will now need to consider how the physical embodiment of a logical
operation is affected by a temporal reversal. We will find there is an apparent
temporal asymmetry in some of these physical processes.
The temporal reversal of the physical operation, at time 12 tL, involves the
system and environment starting in the region of state space ∆TtL = T (∆tL),
with the evolution φ
(t)
TL(∆) = T ◦φ
(tL−t)
L ◦φ
−(tL)
L ◦T (∆). This gives φ
(tL)
TL (∆) =
T ◦ φ
−(tL)
L ◦ T (∆) for the complete operation, acting over 0 ≤ t ≤ tL.
By definition
T ◦ φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ E0) ⊆ Aβ ⊗ΩE (27)
and
φ
(tL)
TL
(
T ◦ φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ E0)
)
= Aα ⊗ E
T
0 ⊆ Aα ⊗ΩE (28)
φ
(tL)
TL has acted as a map from the system being in one of the regions of
state space corresponding to a logical state β to being in a region of state
space corresponding to the initial logical state α. This is what we expect
from a temporal reversal.
If the operation was logically reversible, then for each β there was only
one α for which Aα was mapped to Aβ . Aβ is then mapped back to Aα by
φ
(tL)
TL . The temporal reversal operation acts upon each Aβ and mapping it to
a specific Aα. It is embodying the inverse logical operation to L.
Logically irreversible operations are not invertible functions. There will be
more that one region Aα which was mapped to a given Aβ by the operation
L. The effect of the map φ
(tL)
TL on the region Aβ will be to map it into
several different Aα regions. Where L is a logically irreversible operation,
φ
(tL)
TL does not appear to be the physical embodiment of a logical operation.
There appears to be a fundamental temporal asymmetry in the physical
embodiments of logical operations.
3.2 Indeterministic operations
To better understand the time reversal of logically irreversible operations, we
need to widen the class of operations we are considering, to include indeter-
ministic4 operations[18]:
4 While indeterministic operations can be well defined, and can always be em-
bodied by physical processes, it has been argued that indeterministic operations do
11
We shall call a device logically indeterministic if the input to a device
does not uniquely define the outputs.
The time reversal of the logically reversible IDN and the NOT opera-
tions result in the IDN and NOT operations, respectively. Time reversal of
logically irreversible RTZ, however, results in the indeterministic operation
Unset From Zero (UFZ) in Table 4. Note that the operation UFZ does fulfil
the requirement of logical reversibility, above. For completeness, we also add
the indeterministic, irreversible operation Randomise (RND) in Table 5.
UFZ
IN OUT
0 0
0 1
Table 4 Unset From Zero
RND
IN OUT
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
Table 5 Randomise
A computation is not simply a sequence of operations. It is an ordered
sequence of particular logical operations. If a Universal Turing Machine is
constructed out of a collection of physical processes implementing a par-
ticular set of logically deterministic operations, the time reversal of those
physical processes certainly does not produce the same set of operations. If
the Universal Turing Machine was constructed using deterministic, logically
irreversible operations, the time reversal would not include any logically irre-
versible operations but would include indeterministic operations. This would
not be a Universal Turing Machine.
Logically irreversible operations may be simulated by logically reversible
operations, but under time reversal this still does not recover the original
computation. The logically reversible simulation of the RTZ operation is
given in Table 6, and its time reversal in Table 7.
IN OUT
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
Table 6 Simulating RTZ
IN OUT
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
Table 7 Simulating UFZ
The time reversal is not a reversible simulation of RTZ, it is a deter-
ministic simulation of UFZ. Although, in this case, both simulations can be
achieved by the same logical operation (the CNOT gate), the particular op-
eration that is being simulated changes. A sequence of operations simulating
not count as logical operations([17], for example), although indeterministic opera-
tions are required for computational complexity classes such as BPP , and so form
a part of computational logic. As this point is not important for the discussion
here, we will reserve ‘logical operation’ for logically deterministic operations in this
paper, and refer to logically indeterministic operations as simply ‘indeterministic
operations’.
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irreversible operations becomes a sequence of operations simulating indeter-
ministic operations. If the Universal Turing Machine was constructed using
deterministic, logically reversible operations, simulating logically irreversible
operations, the time reversal would not include any simulations of logically
irreversible operations but would include simulations of indeterministic oper-
ations. This would still not be a Universal Turing Machine. The time reversal
of a Universal Turing Machine is not a Universal Turing Machine. So it would
appear that a computation, as a physical process, may have an arrow of time.
3.3 Logical reversal
With the concept of indeterministic operations in place, we can define a new
concept, the logical reversal of an operation. A logical operation, L, has the
logical reversal operation, RL, which has the same mapping on the logical
states, as the temporal reversal of a physical implementation of the original
operation L. If the operation L maps the input state α to the output state β,
then the logical reversal maps β, as an input state to α, as an output state.
When L is a logically irreversible operation, there are many α mapped to a
given β, so RL will be a logically indeterministic operation, as it may map β
to one of many α. Similarly, if L is a logically indeterministic operation, then
RL will be a logically reversible operation. Unlike the temporal reversal, the
logical reversal acts in the same time direction as the original operation.
We construct RL, first by defining proportions (according to a measure
µ on the state space) of the states acted up by the operation L, that start
and end in the regions representing the logical states. The system starts in
the region ∆0 = ∪αAα⊗E0 and ends in the region ∆tL = φ
(tL)
L (∪αAα⊗E0).
1. That start in logical state α
WL(α) =
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0)
µ (∆0)
2. That end in logical state β given they started in α
WL(β|α) =
µ
(
(Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL
)
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0)
3. That start in logical state α and end in logical state β
WL(α, β) =
µ
(
(Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL
)
µ (∆0)
4. That end in logical state β
WL(β) =
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL)
µ (∆0)
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5. That started in logical state α, given that they ended in logical state β
WL(α|β) =
µ
(
(Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ φ
(tL)
L (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL
)
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL)
These proportions satisfy the expected relationshipWL(α, β) =WL(β|α)WL(α) =
WL(α|β)WL(β). For logically deterministic operations
WL(α|β) ∈ {0, 1}
while for logically reversible operations
WL(β|α) ∈ {0, 1}
We do not include input or output states with measure zero, so WL(α) 6= 0
andWL(β) 6= 0. IfWL(α|β) = 0 for the measure µ, it will be zero for all other
measures, absolutely continuous with µ, that are preserved by the dynamics.
Equivalent statements also hold true for WL(α|β) = 1, WL(β|α) = 0 and
WL(β|α) = 1.
Now consider the temporal reversal TL of this physical process. This acts
upon logical states β and produces logical states α, with proportions
WTL(β) =
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL)
µ (∆tL)
WTL(α|β) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
TL (Aβ ⊗ ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0
)
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩∆tL)
WTL(α, β) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
TL (Aβ ⊗ ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0
)
µ (∆tL)
WTL(α) =
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0)
µ (∆tL)
WTL(β|α) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
TL (Aβ ⊗ ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0
)
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩∆0)
It is straightforward to show that as
WTL(β) =WL(β)
then
WTL(α) =WL(α)
and
WTL(β|α) =WL(β|α)
It is also clear, by definition, that the temporal reversal of TL is just L:
TTL ≡ L
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We will now define the logical reversal operation of L, as a map from the
set of logical states {β} to the set of logical states {α},
{β}
RL
→ {α}
in the same time direction as L, with a dynamic map φ
(tL)
RL such thatWRL(α|β) =
WTL(α|β) =WL(α|β). The system is initially in the region Λ0 = ∪βAβ ⊗E0
and ends in the region ΛtL = φ
(tL)
RL (Λ0). The map should satisfy:
WRL(β) =
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ Λ0)
µ (Λ0)
WRL(α|β) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
RL (Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩ ΛtL
)
µ ((Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ Λ0)
WRL(α, β) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
RL (Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩ ΛtL
)
µ (Λ0)
WRL(α) =
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩ ΛtL)
µ (Λ0)
WRL(β|α) =
µ
(
φ
(tL)
RL (Aβ ⊗ΩE) ∩ (Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩ ΛtL
)
µ ((Aα ⊗ΩE) ∩ ΛtL)
Again, it is straightforward that
WRL(β) =WL(β)
leads to
WRL(α) =WL(α)
and
WRL(β|α) =WL(β|α)
By definition
RRL ≡ L
There is a straightforward method for constructing φRL:
1. Partition each β region into (α, β) subregions, Aβ = ∪αA(α|β), with
A(α|β) ∩ A(α′|β) = ∅ , α 6= α
′ such that
µ (α, β)
µ (β)
=WL(α|β)
2. The evolution of the system must prevent transitions between the subre-
gions
φ(A(α|β)) ∩ φ(A(α′|β′)) = ∅ ∀α 6= α
′, β 6= β′
3. Define regions A′α by joining the α subregions together, from different β
regions
A′α = ∪βA(α|β)
and remove barriers to transitions between subregions with the same α
value.
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4. Evolve the distinct α regions to their final location in state space:
φ(A′α) ⊆ Aα
Further refinements are necessary for thermodynamic optimisation. Explicit
physical processes by which the operations UFZ and RND can be con-
structed and optimised are given in [18] and for generic operations in [19,
29].
3.4 Computational reversal
We will now consider sequences of operations, in a normal entropy increasing
universe. We will not specify the particular set of operations. Our objective is
not to consider the properties of a particular sequence of logical operations,
or even of any sequence of logical operations intended for a particular pur-
pose. We wish to consider the properties of any process that can be defined
exclusively in terms of logical operations acting upon sets of logical states.
In this general situation, we will start with a set of logical states {α0}.
This is acted on by some logical operation L0, and mapped to the set of
output states {α1}. As we are in an entropy increasing universe, we may
assume that any microscopic correlations that have developed between the
information processing apparatus and the environment play no role in the
future evolution of the system. The next logical operation L1 then maps the
logical states {α1} to the logical states {α2}, and so on.
This leads to a time ordered sequence of logical operations, and the se-
quences of logical states which can occur as a result of these operations:
{α0}
L1→ {α1}
L2→ . . .
Li→ {αi}
Li+1
→ . . .
Lf
→ {αf}
We will refer to this sequence as S1{Li}.
We now consider the entropy decreasing universe that results from a time
reversal. In the time reversed, entropy decreasing universe, this computa-
tional sequence becomes S2{TLi}:
{αf}
TLf
→ {αf−1}
TLf−1
→ . . .
TLi+1
→ {αi}
TLi→ . . .
TL1→ {α0}
As we have noted in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the sequence of operations S2{TLi},
involving the time reversed TL operations, will not, in general, resemble the
same computational process as S1{Li}. If S1{Li} is representing the logical
operations performed by a Turing machine, there is no guarantee that the
sequence of operations S2{TLi} resembles a computation at all.
We now return to the original entropy increasing condition, and construct
a physical system in an entropy increasing universe that implements the
operations {RLi}, the logical reversals of the operations {Li}. Staring with
initial logical states {αf}, a measure µ such that the physical representation
of the states have weightsWRLf (αf ) =WLf (αf ), and the reversal operations
{RLi}, such that WRLi(αi−1|αi) = WLi(αi−1|αi), this leads to the time
ordered computational sequence S3{RLi}:
{αf}
RLf
→ {αf−1}
RLf−1
→ . . .
RLi+1
→ {αi}
RLi→ . . .
RL1→ {α0}
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Again, this sequence is quite distinct from S1{Li}. As a sequence of oper-
ations, acting upon the logical states, it is identical to S2{TLi}, as RLi,
by definition, implements the same operation from the set of states {αi} to
{αi−1} as does TLi. However, as noted S2{TLi} need not resemble a com-
putation and so neither need S3{RLi}.
Now we complete the central argument of the paper. The time reversal of
the universe containing the sequence S3{RLi}, gives the sequence S4{TRLi}:
{α0}
TRL1→ {α1}
TRL2→ . . .
TRLi→ {αi}
TRLi+1
→ . . .
TRLf
→ {αf}
This is now in an entropy decreasing universe. However, it follows straight-
forwardly from the definitions above, that TRLi ≡ RTLi ≡ Li, so S4{TRLi}
is
{α0}
L1→ {α1}
L2→ . . .
Li→ {αi}
Li+1
→ . . .
Lf
→ {αf}
The time ordered sequence S4{TRLi} is exactly the same set of logical oper-
ations as S1{Li}, performed in the same order, and on the same set of logical
states. S4{TRLi} takes place in an entropy decreasing universe.
For any computational process consisting of a sequence of logical opera-
tions on a set of logical states, in an entropy increasing universe, the same
computational process is possible in an entropy decreasing universe. Although
we were able to conclude in Section 3.2, above, that computational processes
may have an intrinsic arrow, it does not appear to be the case that this arrow
must be aligned with the thermodynamic arrow.
3.5 Landauer’s Principle
Landauer’s Principle is used as the basis for almost all conclusions regarding
the thermodynamic properties of physical computation, yet the conclusion
of the previous section seems to run counter to many widespread statements
of this Principle:
To erase a bit of information in an environment at temperature T
requires dissipation of energy ≥ kT ln 2. [20,21]
in erasing one bit . . . of information one dissipates, on average, at least
kBT ln (2) of energy into the environment. [22]
a logically irreversible operation must be implemented by a physically
irreversible device, which dissipates heat into the environment [23]
erasure of one bit of information increases the entropy of the environ-
ment by at least k ln 2 [24][pg 27]
any logically irreversible manipulation of data . . . must be accompa-
nied by a corresponding entropy increase in the non-information bear-
ing degrees of freedom of the information processing apparatus or its
environment. Conversely, it is generally accepted that any logically
reversible transformation of information can in principle be accom-
plished by an appropriate physical mechanism operating in a thermo-
dynamically reversible fashion. [25]
Computations are accompanied by dissipation . . . Landauer has shown
that computation requires irreversible processes and heat generation.[1]
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It is Landauer’s Principle on which Schulman basis the alignment of the
thermodynamic and the computational arrows of time.
If Landauer’s Principle is truly regarded as “the basic principle of the
thermodynamics of information processing”[25], how does this reconcile with
the argument of the previous Section, that exactly the same information
processing operations can take place in an entropy decreasing, as an entropy
increasing universe? Does the computer act as a kind of Maxwell’s Demon,
dissipating heat against overall the anti-entropic direction?
The answer is, straightforwardly, no. As has been noted many times
before[26,27,28], Landauer’s Principle is not really a principle. It is a the-
orem, of statistical mechanics, derived[22,29,17,19] on the assumption that
the computation is taking place in an entropy increasing universe. All justi-
fications of Landauer’s Principle, from [10] onwards, make this assumption.
We will briefly review the derivation of Landauer’s Principle in an entropy
increasing universe, to see how the derivation turns out in an entropy de-
creasing universe.
3.5.1 Entropy increase
The states of the physical system embodying logical state α will be repre-
sented by density matrix ρα, and β by ρβ . We assume
5 that the input logical
states {α} and output logical states {β} are represented by states of physical
systems with the same entropy S and mean energies U , so that ∀α, β:
S = −kTr [ρα ln [ρα]] = −kTr [ρβ ln [ρβ]] (29)
U = Tr [HSρα] = Tr [HSρβ] (30)
The input logical states occur with probability Pα, and the logical operation
is defined by the probabilities P (β|α).
In an entropy increasing universe, we make the following assumptions:
1. The evolution of the system and environment is described by Hamiltonian
dynamics, composed of internal energies of the system HS and environ-
ment HE , together with an interaction potential VSE :
H = HS ⊗ IE + IS ⊗HE + VSE
2. The environment is initially in a Gibbs canonical state, at some temper-
ature T , and there are no initial correlations between the system and the
environment.
ρE(T ) =
e−HE/kT
Tr
[
e−HE/kT
] (31)
ρ0 =
∑
α
P (α)ρα ⊗ ρE(T ) (32)
5 This is normal practice in the thermodynamics of computation. In [19] this
assumption is relaxed. The essential conclusions of this Section are not affected.
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3. The interaction energy between system and environment is negligible both
before
Tr [VSEρ0] ≈ 0
and after
Tr
[
VSEe
−ıHtρ0e
ıHt
]
≈ 0
the interaction.
For the Hamiltonian H to embody the logical operation:
TrE
[
e−ıHtρα ⊗ ρE(T )e
ıHt
]
=
∑
β
P (β|α)ρβ
It is a well known calculation[30,31,32,22,19] to show, using:
ρI =
∑
α
P (α)ρα
ρt = e
−ıHtρ0e
ıHt
P (β) =
∑
α
P (β|α)P (α)
ρF = TrE [ρt] =
∑
β
P (β)ρβ
ρ′E = TrS [ρt]
that two inequalities follow:
Tr [ρI ln [ρI ]] + Tr [ρE(T ) ln [ρE(T )]] ≥ Tr [ρF ln [ρF ]] + Tr [ρ
′
E ln [ρ
′
E ]] (33)
Tr
[
ρ′E
(
ln [ρ′E ] +
HE
kT
)]
≥ Tr
[
ρE(T )
(
ln [ρE(T )] +
HE
kT
)]
(34)
which combine to give
∑
α
P (α) lnP (α)−
∑
β
P (β) lnP (β) ≥
Tr [HEρE(T )]
kT
−
Tr [HEρ
′
E ]
kT
(35)
This yields the standard form of Landauer’s Principle, in an entropy increas-
ing universe:
∆Q ≥ −∆HkT ln(2)
where ∆Q is the expectation value for the heat generated in an environment
at temperature T and ∆H is the change in Shannon information over the
course of the operation
∆H =
∑
α
P (α) log2 P (α)−
∑
β
P (β) log2 P (β)
For logically deterministic, reversible computations, it is always the case
that ∆H = 0. These operations do not need to generate heat. On the other
hand, for logically deterministic, irreversible operations ∆H < 0 and so the
heat generated in the environment is always positive. This is the basis of the
claim that logically irreversible operations must be entropy increasing6.
6 In [27,18,19] it is argued that even this heat generation is not necessarily ther-
modynamically irreversible.
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3.5.2 Entropy decrease
In an entropy decreasing universe, we would still make the assumptions that
the input logical states {α} and output logical states {β} are represented by
physical systems with the same entropy and mean energies. The logical state
α is represented by the density matrix ρα, and β by ρβ , as before. The input
logical states occur with probability Pα, and the logical operation is defined
by the probabilities P (β|α).
We continue to assume:
1. The evolution of the system and environment is described by Hamiltonian
dynamics.
H ′ = H ′S ⊗ IE + IS ⊗H
′
E + V
′
SE
2. The interaction energy between system and environment is negligible both
before
Tr [V ′SEρ0] ≈ 0
and after
Tr
[
V ′SEe
−ıH′tρ0e
ıH′t
]
≈ 0
the interaction.
but the imposition of a future boundary condition must require the local
conditions to be:
3. After the operation the environment is in a Gibbs canonical state, at some
temperature T , and there are no final microscopic correlations between
the system and the environment.
Now, for the HamiltonianH ′ to fulfil these conditions and embody the logical
operation it is necessary that
TrE
[
eıH
′tρβ ⊗ ρE(T )e
−ıH′t
]
=
∑
α
P (β|α)P (α)∑
α′ P (β|α
′)P (α′)
ρα
and
ρt =
∑
β,α
P (β|α)P (α)ρβ ⊗ ρE(T )
Using:
ρ0 = e
ıH′tρte
−ıH′t
ρI = TrE [ρ0] =
∑
α
P (α)ρα
ρ′E = TrS [ρ0]
P (β) =
∑
α
P (β|α)P (α)
ρF = TrE [ρt] =
∑
β
P (β)ρβ
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the two inequalities become
Tr [ρF ln [ρF ]] + Tr [ρE(T ) ln [ρE(T )]] ≥ Tr [ρI ln [ρI ]] + Tr [ρ
′
E ln [ρ
′
E ]]
Tr
[
ρ′E
(
ln [ρ′E ] +
H ′E
kT
)]
≥ Tr
[
ρE(T )
(
ln [ρE(T )] +
H ′E
kT
)]
which combine to give
−
∑
α
P (α) lnP (α) +
∑
β
P (β) lnP (β) ≥
Tr [H ′EρE(T )]
kT
−
Tr [H ′Eρ
′
E ]
kT
Paying careful attention to the fact that ρE(T ) is now the final state of
the environment the statistical mechanical calculation leads to:
∆Q ≤ −∆HkT ln(2)
where ∆Q is the expectation value for the heat generated in an environment.
For logically deterministic, irreversible operations∆H < 0 and so the heat
generated in the environment is less than the positive number −∆HkT ln(2).
For logically deterministic, reversible computations, ∆H = 0 as before, but
this now just means the heat generation must be less than zero. In an entropy
decreasing universe, the derivation of Landauer’s Principle yields a maximum
heat generation. If less than the maximum heat is generated, then there will
have been an uncompensated decrease in the entropy of the universe.
This is, of course, exactly what we should have expected! In entropy
decreasing universes, the physical processes which embody computations are,
generically, entropy decreasing processes. There is no contradiction between
the statistical mechanical basis of Landauer’s Principle, and the conclusions
of Section 3.4.
4 The Correlation Arrow
It has been argued in the previous Sections that, although a computer may
possess a computational arrow, its functioning as a physical process does
not imply the alignment of that arrow with the thermodynamic arrow. The
argument was based upon all the same computational operations that can
take place in an entropy increasing universe being physically possible in an
entropy decreasing universe. This still leaves open the possibility that it is
much more likely for systems to develop which process information in the
same direction as entropy increase, than systems which process information
in the direction of entropy decrease.
Turning to this question, the arguments will seem less concrete than in the
previous sections. This is a consequence of the need to consider if cosmological
boundary conditions, over the lifetime of the universe, on the state of the
whole universe, may have influences on the localised behaviour of systems,
operating over short timescales, at a time in between, and very far from,
either initial or final state of the universe. It is unclear how secure the chain
of reasoning involved in understanding such influences can be (see [7], for
example, for a sceptical view).
How might such an argument be constructed? Hawking[2] suggests:
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If one imposes a final boundary condition . . . one can show that the
correlation between the computer memory and the surroundings is
greater at early times than at late times. In other words, the computer
remembers the future, but not the past.
Similar arguments are presented in [11,12].
The acquisition of information requires an increase in the correlation be-
tween the computer and its surroundings. A future boundary condition, as
interpreted in Section 2.3, requires correlations to decrease in time. To ex-
plore this requires a move beyond the consideration of a computer as an
information processor. We must take into account the nature of the informa-
tion that the system processes. It is a system that acquires new information
about its surroundings and interacts with its surroundings conditional upon
the information it has acquired. Such behaviour has been characterised as an
Information Gathering and Utilising System, or IGUS.
4.1 Information Gathering and Utilising Systems
The behaviour of an IGUS may be described as:
1. There is a correlation between the macroscopic states of the internal states
of an IGUS and the macroscopic states of its surroundings.
2. These macroscopic correlations occurred through an interaction of the
system with the surroundings, in the past. At an earlier point in time
the macroscopic correlations did not exist. The existing correlations are
screened off by an earlier interaction.
3. New macroscopic correlations develop over time through conditional in-
teractions. These can change the macroscopic internal states of the system
conditional upon the states of the surroundings, or change the states of
the surroundings, conditional upon the internal states of the system.
4. Any macroscopic correlations between the current state of the system
and future states of its surroundings, are screened off by the existing
correlations and interactions between system and environment that take
place between the present and the future time.
The argument of Hawking is that such behaviour is compatible with an initial
boundary condition, but incompatible with a future boundary condition.
We can examine this in two equivalent ways. The first is to consider an
IGUS in an entropy increasing and in an entropy decreasing universe. The
second way is to consider the time reversal of these two scenarios. This will
give a information processing system which is the logical reversal of an IGUS,
in an entropy decreasing and in an entropy increasing universe, respectively.
We refer to the logical reversal of an IGUS as an RIGUS. The statement
that an entropy decreasing universe is incompatible with the operation of an
IGUS is equivalent to the statement that an entropy increasing universe is
incompatible with an RIGUS.
The question needing answering is whether an entropy increasing universe
prefers systems resembling an IGUS over systems resembling an RIGUS. If
so the same argument should support the existence of an RIGUS compared
to an IGUS in an entropy decreasing universe.
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The behaviour of an RIGUS will appear as:
1. There is a correlation between the macroscopic states of the internal states
of an RIGUS and the macroscopic states of its surroundings.
2. These macroscopic correlations will disappear through a conditional in-
teraction of the system with the surroundings, at some point in future.
At a later point in time the macroscopic correlations will not exist.
3. There decrease in macroscopic correlations over time is through condi-
tional interactions with the surroundings. These can change the macro-
scopic internal states of the system conditional upon the states of the
surroundings, or change the states of the surroundings, conditional upon
the internal states of the system.
4. Any macroscopic correlations between the current state of the system and
past states of its surroundings is screened off by the existing correlations
and interactions between the past time and the present.
Fortunately we do not need to construct explicit models for an IGUS or an
RIGUS. All we need to know is that either system must be constructed out
of the kind of operations described in the previous sections.
It is now necessary to draw a distinction between the environmental de-
grees of freedom of a heat bath, and the macroscopic states of the surround-
ings that a computer might be correlated with. The set {Ai} refer to the
internal logical states of the IGUS. The macroscopically distinct regions of
the surroundings are {Bi}. We represent the inaccessible regions of the envi-
ronment by a separate subsystem ΩE , which has no macroscopically distin-
guishable subregions. The overall state of the universe at time t is represented
by ∆t.
4.2 Growth in correlations
Acquisition of knowledge is represented in the following terms. At a time t1
the computer is in the blank state represented by A0, while the surroundings
are in one of the regions Bi. The region of state space is
∆i,t1 = Bi ⊗A0 ⊗ Et1 (36)
and the overall possible region is
Θt1 = ∪iBi ⊗A0 ⊗ Et1 (37)
The acquisition of information requires an evolution between t1 and t2
for which:
∆i,t2 = φ
(t2) ◦ φ−(t1)(∆i,t1) ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ΩE (38)
In an entropy increasing universe, we replace this by the coarse graining
Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ Ei,t2 ⊇ ∆i,t2 , for which
Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ Ei,t2 ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
′
i,t2 (39)
for all E′i,t2 that satisfy:
∆t2 ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
′
i,t2 ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ΩE (40)
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The overall region is
Θt2 = ∪iφ
(t2) ◦ φ−(t1)(Bi ⊗A0 ⊗ Et1) (41)
which has a coarse graining ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ Et2 ⊇ Θt2 , such that
∪i Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ Et2 ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
′
t2 (42)
for all E′t2 that satisfy:
Θt2 ⊆ ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
′
t2 ⊆ ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ΩE (43)
Now let us consider the reverse procedure, that would indicate the exis-
tence of an RIGUS. Start in Λi,t1 = Bi⊗Ai⊗Et1 and perform the evolution
Λi,t2 = φ
(t2)
R ◦ φ
−(t1)
R (Λi,t1) ⊆ Bi ⊗A0 ⊗ΩE (44)
This leads to the coarse graining
Λi,t2 ⊆ Bi ⊗A0 ⊗ E
R
i,t2 (45)
and the overall region
ΘRt1 = ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ Et1 (46)
evolves into
ΘRt2 = ∪iφ
(t2)
R ◦ φ
−(t1)
R (Bi ⊗ Ai ⊗ Et1) (47)
which has a coarse graining ∪iBi ⊗A0 ⊗ ERt2 ⊇ Θ
R
t2 , such that
∪i Bi ⊗A0 ⊗ ERt2 ⊆ Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
R′
t2 (48)
for all ER′t2 such that:
ΘRt2 ⊆ ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ E
R′
t2 ⊆ ∪iBi ⊗Ai ⊗ΩE (49)
4.2.1 Measures on marginals
We now ask whether the requirement that an RIGUS starts in a correlated
state, and removes those correlations, is less compatible with an entropy
increasing universe than an IGUS. We will assume that the internal states
of the IGUS and RIGUS have equivalent measures: µ(A0) = µ(Ai).
First consider the measure of the initial states:
µ(Θt1 ) = µ(Θ
R
t1) (50)
An immediate consequence is that volume of state space arguments will not
be able to show preference for an IGUS over an RIGUS on the basis of one
or the other being simply more likely to occur at t1.
From the measure preserving nature of the evolution of the IGUS we
have
µ(∆i,t1 ) = µ(∆i,t2) (51)
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while the coarse graining gives
µ(Bi)µ(A0)µ(Et1) ≤ µ(Bi)µ(Ai)µ(Ei,t2) (52)
Similarly
µ(Θt1 ) = µ(Θt2) (53)
which when coarse grained gives
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(A0)µ(Et1) ≤
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(Ai)µ(Ei,t2) ≤
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(Ai)µ(Et2)
(54)
Using µ(A0) = µ(Ai), we get:
µ(Et1) ≤
∑
i µ(Bi)µ(Ei,t2)∑
i µ(Bi)
≤ µ(Et2) (55)
While this might indicate an increase in entropy, we can easily get similar
results for the RIGUS. The measures for the reverse interaction are
µ(Λi,t1) = µ(Λi,t2) (56)
while the coarse graining gives
µ(Bi)µ(Ai)µ(Et1 ) ≤ µ(Bi)µ(A0)µ(E
R
i,t2) (57)
Similarly
µ(ΘRt1 ) = µ(Θ
R
t2) (58)
which when coarse grained gives
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(Ai)µ(Et1 ) ≤
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(A0)µ(ERi,t2) ≤
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(A0)µ(ERt2)
(59)
and µ(A0) = µ(Ai), gives:
µ(Et1) ≤
∑
i µ(Bi)µ(E
R
i,t2)∑
i µ(Bi)
≤ µ(ERt2) (60)
It is clear that this RIGUS interaction is just as entropy increasing as the
IGUS interaction. The direct growth in macroscopic correlations of an IGUS
is no more indicative of entropy increase than the reduction in macroscopic
correlations associated with an RIGUS.
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4.2.2 Micro- and macro-correlations
The loss of microcorrelation with the environment is responsible for the in-
crease in entropy. This happens both for the macroscopically correlating in-
teractions of an IGUS and its reverse, RIGUS. What of the macroscopic
correlations themselves? These are the correlations which are supposed to be
forbidden to develop within an entropy decreasing universe.
While it is certainly true that the measure over the marginals increases
during information acquisition:
∑
i
µ(Bi)
∑
j
µ(Aj) ≥
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(Ai) =
∑
i
µ(Bi)µ(A0) (61)
(where we continue to assume µ(Ai) = µ(A0)) this is a qualitatively different
kind of increase to that associated with microcorrelations. The coarse grain-
ing over the microcorrelations, that corresponds to entropy increase, is asso-
ciated with the inaccessibility of these microcorrelations. If the microscopic
correlations were still accessible (in the manner of a spin-echo experiment)
no entropy increase could be said to have occurred.
In the case of the macrocorrelations, however, it is essential that the
correlations be accessible. It is precisely because the coarse grained state
is ∪iBi ⊗ Ai ⊗ Et2 and not ∪iBi ⊗ ∪jAj ⊗ Et2 , that the IGUS is said to
have information about its surroundings. It is the correlation that represents
the information, that enables to IGUS to utilise that information in its
interactions and future behaviour.
The transition:
∪i Bi ⊗Ai ⊗ Et2 → ∪iBi ⊗ ∪jAj ⊗ Et2 (62)
would represent a decorrelation, that would destroy the information that the
IGUS held about the state of its surroundings. So the equivalent operation
to the increase in entropy associated with losing microcorrelations, is not
associated with an acquisition of information, but with its loss.
Let us consider the process by which such decorrelation occurs. In an
entropy increasing universe, each thermodynamically irreversible operation
increases the entropy of the surroundings and environment. Noise causes
the switching of the computer’s internal states, or a switching (or change)
of the environmental states. An IGUS must maintain the relevance of its
information by protecting against changes and checking the accuracy of its
information. As the environmental degrees of freedom become saturated, the
existence of noise cannot be protected against and decorrelation becomes
irreversible. The computer ceases to be able to function, as the universe
approaches a maximum entropy heat death.
Now it is precisely the fact that such irreversible decorrelation does not
occur (except on very large timescales), that normally makes the information
gathered useful. The utilisation of acquired information requires the existence
of stable, accessible, macroscopic correlations, so that the overall state, ∪iBi⊗
Ai cannot be replaced by the direct product of the marginal states, ∪iBi ⊗
∪jAj . By contrast, the increase in thermodynamic entropy is due to the loss
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of microscopic correlations, which are presumed inaccessible. This means that
the regions∆i,t2 = φ
(t2)◦φ−(t1)(Bi⊗A0⊗Et1) ⊆ Bi⊗Ai⊗ΩE can be replaced
by the coarse grained, direct product of their marginal states, Bi⊗Ai⊗Ei,t2 .
The role played by correlations in macroscopic information and microscopic
entropy turns out to be of a quite different nature.
4.3 No interaction, no correlation
There remains an intuition that, nevertheless, the kind of evolutions char-
acterised as an IGUS should still be more likely to occur that the kind of
evolutions characterised by an RIGUS. We will examine this further by con-
sidering a simple system, with two states of the environment Bi and two
states of an IGUS, Ai. If we suppose the system goes through the following
stages:
A0⊗B0 → A0⊗(B0 ⊕ B1)→ (A0 ⊗B0)⊕(A1 ⊗B1)→ (A0 ⊕A1)⊗(B0 ⊕B1)
(63)
Initially the system is in the low entropy, uncorrelated state. The environment
evolves into one of two possible states. The system then measures the state
of the environment, becoming correlated. Eventually decorrelation leads to
heat death.
The reverse, RIGUS, would involve:
A0⊗B0 → (A0 ⊗B0)⊕(A1 ⊗B1)→ A0⊗(B0 ⊕B1)→ (A0 ⊕A1)⊗(B0 ⊕B1)
(64)
At first sight, this evolution seems implausible. We start with the low entropy,
uncorrelated state. Correlations spontaneously appear. The RIGUS removes
these correlations, before noise, once again, leads to a heat death.
The problem in constructing a justification for eliminating the RIGUS
evolution on entropic grounds is that:
µ(A0)µ(B0) ≤ µ(A0)µ(B0)+µ(A1)µ(B1) = µ(A0)(µ(B0)+µ(B1)) ≤ (µ(A0)+µ(A1))(µ(B0)+µ(B1))
(65)
the two intermediate states between the uncorrelated and the decorrelated
states can have the same measure.
Our intuition says that A0⊗(B0 ⊕B1) will occur first rather than (A0 ⊗B0)⊕
(A1 ⊗B1). The spontaneously correlated state would require all initial states
in A0 ⊗ B0 to evolve into either A0 ⊗ B0 or A1 ⊗ B1. To achieve this it is
necessary for a correlated interaction to take place. If it is the case that at
t = 0, there is no correlation, and the two systems do not interact (or share
interaction with any combination of intermediary systems) between t = 0
and t = τ , then
φ(τ)(A0 ⊗B0) = φ
(τ)(A0)⊗ φ
(τ)(B0) (66)
Whatever else might be the case, such an evolution cannot possibly induce
a correlation.
If it seems surprising that such a conclusion can be drawn so rapidly after
the negative conclusion of the previous section, it is important to notice the
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different. The entropic argument was based upon measures upon state space
regions. This argument is based upon a restriction upon allowed evolutions
of the combined system.
At first sight this might seem to provide the answer, neatly and simply.
In an entropy increasing universe, the existence of macroscopic correlation at
some intermediate time requires the existence of a macroscopic correlating
interaction at an earlier time. By contrast, in an entropy decreasing universe,
the existence of macroscopic correlations at the intermediate time requires
the existence of a macroscopic decorrelating interaction in the future. This
appears to bear out Hawking’s’ claim that macrocorrelations must decrease.
However, there are problems when one considers more complicated situ-
ations than the two state systems considered here. The no-interaction, no-
correlation argument presented would rule out the development of micro-
scopic correlations just as effectively as it rules out the development of macro-
scopic correlations. In an entropy increasing universe, microcorrelationsmust
develop, so it seems that the restriction of equation 66 is simply too strong
to represent the world. Once we allow microscopic correlations to be devel-
oping, it is less clear what condition on the dynamics is necessary to ensure
an RIGUS is less likely than an IGUS.
It might also seem implausible that the non-existence of an RIGUS here
and now, can genuinely be because of a boundary condition in the remote
past. All the condition implies is that, given the existence of a macroscopic
correlation now, that there must have been, some time between now and the
start of the universe, a macroscopic interaction. It does not even guarantee
that the systems which are correlated, now, are the ones that interacted in
the past - only that there must have been an interaction in the past that has
had causal influences upon the two systems now.
In the time reversed situation, the future boundary condition is supposed
to prevent the operation of an IGUS. However, all the future boundary con-
dition actually guarantees is that, at some point in the future there must be
a macroscopic interaction to remove the correlation. It does not guarantee
that this interaction must involve the system currently correlated to its sur-
roundings. Given the timescale involved for the future boundary condition
to apply, there seems a long way to go to show that a remote final condi-
tion is sufficient to rule out the existence of IGUS systems in an entropy
decreasing universe. However, if true, this implies that a remote boundary
condition has a more direct effect upon possible states now than just through
the conditions given in Sections 2.1 and 2.3.
The argument now begins to resemble attempts to base the causal fork
asymmetry on entropic arguments7. The literature on this topic is too large
to consider here (see [4,5,13,33] and for criticisms see [34,7,35]). However,
to question how clear the argument is from a remote boundary condition to
situations now, we will simply consider two scenarios. The first will be Schul-
man’s two time boundary condition, where both initial and future boundary
condition constraints exist. The second will be a situation where a local
entropy gradient exists, but without either an initial or future boundary con-
7 Note, this cannot have been Hawking’s intent, at least, as earlier in [2] he speaks
dismissively of causality and the arguments of [4].
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dition. While these scenarios may be regarded as implausible, their purpose
is to examine if there are gaps in the arguments based upon remote boundary
conditions.
4.3.1 Two time boundary conditions
Suppose that we are in a two time boundary condition universe such as Schul-
man proposes, but for which the thermalisation time is much greater than
half the lifespan of the universe. In such a situation one might find an over-
lap between the entropy increasing and decreasing portions of space-time. It
may then be possible for a complex system, operating in a thermodynami-
cally reversible manner, to operate in both temporal halves of the universe.
Now suppose such a system is a computer is designed to work very close
the thermodynamic reversibility, and can swap from a power source suitable
for an entropy increasing universe to a power source suitable for an entropy
decreasing universe.
Why is it the case that, when the computer enters the entropy decreasing
timespan, it ceases to operate as an IGUS? All we can say is that, ultimately,
any information it gathers, must be lost again before the universe reaches its
final low entropy state. That seems to leave a large amount of time over which
it is able to function! Of course, such a scenario also allows the possibility
of an equivalent RIGUS existing in the entropy increasing period of time.
The emergence of such a RIGUS may be taken as an indicator that a future
boundary condition exists. However, there seems no direct reasoning, from
thermodynamics, to tell us how far in the future is such a boundary condition
located. If this is the case, we equally cannot tell how long an IGUS will be
able to continue to operate in an entropy decreasing universe.
4.3.2 Asymmetry without boundary conditions
The crossover, from a entropy increasing to decreasing universe, raises addi-
tional problems, if we are to consider the interactions between an IGUS and
an RIGUS in the same region of space-time. We can remove this problem
by considering another, rather exotic, situation, which questions whether a
remote boundary condition could possibly be responsible for the absence of
RIGUS systems.
Consider a system, identical to the solar system except in two respects: the
sun is not a sun, but a boundary that absorbs, scatters and emits photons
and particles into the solar system, with exactly the same profile as our
sun does; and around the solar system (just around the Oort cloud) there
is another closed boundary, that absorbs, scatters and emits photons and
particles into the solar system with the same profile as the radiation crossing
a hypothetical surface enclosing our solar system. Now suppose that this
completely enclosed system has been in this state indefinitely far into the
past, and will be in this state indefinitely far into the future.
Such a system is explicitly time asymmetric. The profile of the radiation
being absorbed, scattered and emitted on the two boundaries is quite different
when viewed in a time reverse direction. In a normal time direction the solar
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boundary emits low entropy radiation, some of which falls upon an earth-
like planet and is reradiated in a higher entropy form. Most of the solar
radiation, along with most of the earthly re-radiation is eventually absorbed
by the Oort boundary, which radiates a negligibly small amount of radiation
back (largely concentrated at small points) apart from a roughly symmetric
emission and absorbtion of radiation at the cosmic microwave background
frequency. Reversing the time direction will produce a quite different profile
of emission and absorbtion on the two boundaries.
Let us ignore issues, such as the question of the long term stability of the
solar system and so forth, which are not directly relevant to the present day
thermodynamics of our solar system. For much of the history of life on our
earth, there has been a reasonably stable non-equilibrium state, maintained
by the local entropy gradient between the radiation falling on earth, from
our sun, and re-radiated out again. The enclosed solar system will be in a
stable non-equilibrium state much like our solar system, including the earth-
like planet. It would seem reasonable to expect conditions on the earth-like
planet to resemble conditions on our earth.
The principal argument of this paper has been that there appears noth-
ing in the thermodynamics of the local conditions on the earth-like planet
that prevents the existence of an RIGUS. The no-interaction no-correlation
argument suggests that a remote initial boundary condition prevents it on
our earth. However, in the enclosed solar system, there is no remote initial
boundary condition. If an RIGUS is still not possible in the enclosed solar
system, it must be the case that there is something about the local entropy
gradient that prevents it, rather than an initial boundary condition.
If the remote initial boundary condition has an influence on the state
of our earth only through the entropy difference between the incoming and
outgoing radiation, then the cause of the absence of an RIGUS on earth
must be the same as on the enclosed earth-like planet. We have found no
explanation in terms of the local entropy gradient to prevent an RIGUS, so
if the local entropy gradient screens off the effect of a remote initial boundary
condition, then such a condition cannot provide an argument against the
existence of an RIGUS on our earth.
Alternatively, the remote initial boundary condition may have a direct
effect on the conditions on earth today that is not screened off by the local
entropy gradient. In this case it may prevent the existence of an RIGUS on
our earth, but leaves the possibility of an RIGUS on the enclosed earth-like
planet. It is hard to see what kind of process could supply such a direct
effect, or how this would lead to conditions being so radically different on
the enclosed earth-like planet, but one possibility might be the asymmetry
of electromagnetic radiation, between advanced and retarded waves.
5 NESS, not QSES. Complexity, not information
Any process that is a sequence of Quasi-Static Equilibrium States (QSES)
can, in principle, be connected by thermodynamically reversible processes (it
is this that enables us to determine the entropy difference between them).
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Let us consider a specific example: the paradigmatic ice cube melting in a
glass of water, and the film of this being run backwards.
There is nothing about the two states: an ice cube in glass; and a glass
of water; that tells us one must come before the other. It is entirely possible
in an entropy increasing universe, for the ice cube to be in the future of the
glass of water. There are entropy increasing processes by which a glass of
water can be turned into a glass containing an ice cube. In the limiting case,
of reversible quasistatic processes, we can go back and forward between ice
cube and water, thermodynamically reversibly.
The same is equally true in an entropy decreasing universe. In such a
universe there would also be entropy decreasing processes by which glasses
of water could be converted into ice cubes in glasses and ice cubes in glasses
converted into glasses of water.
The asymmetry in the process, with which we are familiar, is not the
fact that an ice cube is succeeded by water, but is in the process by which
it happens. It is the non-equilibrium nature of the process that reveals the
entropic direction. It is the fact that the ice cube is in the process of melting
that tells us the ‘correct’ direction of the film.
The generalisation of the arguments Section 3.4 is that any process, which
can be defined solely in terms of a (deterministic or probabilistic) succession
of QSES, can occur in an entropy increasing universe and in an entropy
decreasing universe. What distinguishes the two universes is not a possible
succession of QSES, but rather the processes by which the transitions between
the states can take place. This suggests that, if one is to find connections to
an entropic arrow of time, we should not be looking at the QSES that are
the thermodynamically reversible limit for information processing systems.
Any process which can be defined solely in terms of such states can occur in
either entropic direction.
The existence of Non-Equilibrium Steady States (NESS), on the other
hand, are not time symmetric. Complex biochemical structures that arise
in far from equilibrium conditions are associated with fundamentally time
asymmetric, entropy increasing processes. The time reverse of these processes
in entropy decreasing universes will lead to a different sequence of NESS,
entropy decreasing processes. These complex structures are also the building
blocks from which the biological processes are constructed that are necessary
to house the information gathering and utilising systems.
A generalisation of this may be conjectured: any time asymmetry that
is supposed to be a consequence of the thermodynamic time asymmetry,
cannot be expressed solely in terms of sequences of QSES. If we are to find
stable states whose time asymmetry is a consequence of thermodynamics,
their properties must come from NESS, not QSES. This suggests that the
ideas of complexity, rather than information, are needed.
6 Conclusion
The argument of this paper is that an arrow of time associated with infor-
mation processing systems cannot be deduced from thermodynamic argu-
ments. The thermodynamic arrow is insufficient to entail the computational
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arrow. Any sequence of logical operations in an entropy increasing universe is
physically possible in an entropy decreasing universe. Landauer’s Principle,
as it is commonly stated, assumes statistical mechanical principles that are
equivalent to being in an entropy increasing universe. If one changes those
assumptions, so that one is in an entropy decreasing universe, a critical in-
equality in Landauer’s Principle in reversed. The physical implementation
of logical operations, which increase entropy, do so, not by virtue of any
inherent properties of the logical operation, but by virtue of being in an en-
tropy increasing universe. If the same logical operation is performed in an
entropy decreasing universe, it is entropy decreasing. As a result, entropy
decreasing universes are not inherently hostile to the acquisition, persistence
or utilisation of information.
In principle, the operation of acquiring information can be made ther-
modynamically reversible. This is precisely one of the main insights of Lan-
dauer’s work on the thermodynamics of computation: a measurement can
take place without generating heat (see [36,24] and many references within).
Landauers principle, while perhaps obvious in retrospect, makes it
clear that information processing and acquisition have no intrinsic,
irreducible thermodynamic cost[25]
If the acquisition of information can take place in a thermodynamically neu-
tral manner, it can take place in an entropy decreasing as easily as an entropy
increasing universe.
While any information gathering and utilising system will ultimately cease
to function in an entropy decreasing universe that reaches a final extremal
entropy state, this doesn’t seem sufficient to rule out such systems8. Firstly,
the decrease in entropy is due to the decorrelation that comes about from
losing microcorrelations. It is of a different kind to the macrocorrelations
that arise during the acquisition of information. Secondly, on the timescales
during which information gathering and utilising systems work, between the
low or high entropy extremal starting and ending points, there seems nothing
to directly prefer IGUS over RIGUS. Thirdly, if the effect of the initial or
future boundary conditions is screened off by the local entropy gradient, the
no correlation, no interaction argument does not seem to be applicable, as
such an entropy gradient can exist in a situation with no initial or final
boundary condition.
The suggestion is made that an entropic arrow of time will never be found
in processes that can be defined solely in terms of a succession of Quasi-
Static Equilibrium States. Information processing can be so defined. If the
psychological arrow of time is to be aligned with the thermodynamic arrow,
it cannot be through the information processing properties of the brain. It
may be through the biochemical structures that arise in Non-Equilibrium
Steady State processes, but if so, it is certainly not through any information
processing characterisation of such structures. This would seem to imply that
at least one aspect of conscious experience cannot be logically supervenient
on the states of a computer. If instead the psychological arrow of time does
8 Quite aside from the fact that it must also ultimately cease to function in an
entropy increasing universe.
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indeed arise out of information processing properties, this would mean that
the psychological arrow is logically independent of the thermodynamic arrow
of time.
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